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We previously reported finding that performance was impaired on four out of five theory
of mind (ToM) tests in a group of 21 individuals diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia
(pScz), relative to a non-clinical group of 29 individuals (Scherzer et al., 2012). Only
the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test did not distinguish between groups. A principal
components analysis revealed that the results on the ToM battery could be explained by
one general ToM factor with the possibility of a latent second factor. As well, the tests
were not equally sensitive to the pathology. There was also overmentalization in some
ToM tests and under-mentalisation in others. These results led us to postulate that there
is more than one component to ToM. We hypothesized that correlations between the
different EF measures and ToM tests would differ sufficiently within and between groups
to support this hypothesis. We considered the relationship between the performance on
eight EF tests and five ToM tests in the same diagnosed and non-clinical individuals as
in the first study. The ToM tests shared few EF correlates and each had its own best EF
predictor. These findings support the hypothesis of multiple ToM components.
Keywords: schizophrenia, paranoid symptoms, theory of mind, executive functions
INTRODUCTION
Theory of Mind
Theory of mind (ToM) is but one component of social cognition Green et al. (2008). ToM is
deﬁned as the ability to attribute, correctly or incorrectly, beliefs, knowledge, feelings or intentions
to others, in order to understand and predict their behavior (Perner, 1991; Perner and Lang, 2000;
Green et al., 2008). The discovery of this ability coupled with the large inventory of tests used as
a measure, allowed researchers to make strides in the understanding of atypical development and
speciﬁcally in schizophrenia (Scz) (Frith, 1992; Frith and Corcoran, 1996; Langdon and Coltheart,
1999; Champagne et al., 2005; Champagne-Lavau et al., 2006, 2007; Uhlhaas et al., 2006; Martino
et al., 2007).
Theory of Mind and Schizophrenia
Research in social cognition in Scz has revealed reliable and large impairments in understanding
ﬁrst and second order false beliefs (Bora et al., 2009a; Bozikas et al., 2011), understanding
indirect messages (Corcoran et al., 1995; Greig et al., 2004), inferring aﬀect based on photos
of the area around the eyes (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) identifying irony and faux pas
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(Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005; Chung et al., 2014), and making
inferences concerning real time social interactions (Bazin et al.,
2009; Ouellet et al., 2010; Montag et al., 2011).
Executive Functions and ToM in
Schizophrenia
Executive functions are considered to be a critical cognitive
mediator for ToM (Perner and Lang, 2000). The link between
executive deﬁcits and ToM impairment may be explained by
diﬃculty in inhibiting one’s own perspective and distinguishing
it from others (Ruby and Decety, 2003). A diﬃculty in
making non-literal interpretations may be due to a diﬃculty
in inhibiting a usual interpretation (Leslie et al., 2004), a lack
of ﬂexibility that is reﬂected in diﬃculties judging the relative
importance of each aspect of a script and attributing the
appropriate importance to the pertinent information (Channon
and Crawford, 2000).
Signiﬁcant correlations have been found between a large
variety of EF tests and ToM in patients with Scz (see for example
Langdon et al., 2001; Bell and Mishara, 2006; Bora et al., 2006a;
but see Lysaker et al., 2008 for a contrary opinion and results).
Pickup (2008) analyzed 17 studies, eight of which reported a
signiﬁcant correlation between ToM and EF. Although there is a
link between the two, he found that the patients were impaired on
tests of ToM compared with control subjects, even when EF were
factored out. On the other hand, he found that EF shared 65%
of the variance on ToM tests in the clinical groups while there
was no signiﬁcant correlation in the non-clinical group (Pickup,
2008).
Bora et al. (2006a) used a battery to probe the relationship
between insight into illness, ToM (RMET, ﬁrst and second order
false belief stories) and EF (WCST, Digit Span, verbal ﬂuency,
letter-number sequencing). RMET correlated with Digit Span
backward and letter-number sequencing, but not WCST. Second
order false beliefs correlated with letter-number sequencing,
WCST perseveration and categories, but not with Digit Span
backward. These results could lead one to consider that there
are likely diﬀerent ToM components as diﬀerent ToM tests load
diﬀerentially on EF tests. These discrepancies in results and
divergent approaches in the analyses point to inconsistencies in
the literature and raise questions about the structure or content
of what is being measured.
Montag et al. (2011) identiﬁed one ToM component the
cognitive/emotional content (see also Shamay-Tsoory et al.,
2007). Hynes et al. (2006) identiﬁed a diﬀerential activation
pattern depending on whether the social perspective-taking
task was emotional or cognitive, with activation of the
medial orbitofrontal lobe distinguishing between the two
conditions. Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2006) found that patients
with ventromedial prefrontal lesions performed better in the
cognitive than in the emotional condition. The diﬀerentiation
between the two components was further conﬁrmed using ToM
tests (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2006, 2007; See Abu-Akel and
Shamay-Tsoory, 2011 for a résumé of the neural circuitry of
the components that they identify that include cognitive and
emotional components). Salvatore et al. (2008, p. 193, paragraph
1) present an argument, based on data from diﬀerent populations,
in support of a multi- component ToM. However, the clinical
evidence extracted from an interview with two patients diagnosed
with schizophrenia leaves the debate unresolved.
Objectives and Hypotheses
The present study is an attempt to reexamine the link between
ToM (faux pas, lies, indirect messages, inferring facial expressions
of emotions etc) and EF (cognitive ﬂexibility, deductive
reasoning, etc), in a group of patients diagnosed with paranoid
schizophrenia (pScz) to determine if diﬀerent EF measures, are
equally good predictors of performance on a battery of ToM tests
and if the ToM tests share the same relationship with the EF
measures. We predict that although the clinical group will be
impaired relative to a non-clinical group on the ToM measures,
with the exception of the RMET (Scherzer et al., 2012), that
performance on some ToM measures better distinguish between
the two groups than others.
We further predict that performance on all the EF tests will
be impaired in the pScz group relative to the non-clinical group
but the pScz group will perform better on some EFmeasures than
others. Finally, we predict that correlations between the diﬀerent
EF measures and ToM tests, will diﬀer suﬃciently within and
between groups to support the contention that there is more than
one component to ToM.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The ethics committee of the Département de psychologie,
Université du Québec à Montréal and the ethics and scientiﬁc
committee (Comité d’éthique de la recherché) of the Hôpital
Louis H. Lafontaine (recently renamed Institut Universitaire en
Santé Mentale de Montréal) approved the protocol. Informed
written consent was obtained from each subject prior to study
entry.
Participants
Twenty-one patients diagnosed with pScz and a group of 29 non-
clinical individuals were recruited for the study (more details
in Scherzer et al., 2012). The subjects were all males, between
18 and 35 years old, either native French speakers or having
received all of their schooling in French. Their IQ (VIQ and PIQ,
FSIQ) was ≥85. Individuals with Axis I and/or II comorbidity,
neurologic problems, head trauma, alcoholism, substance abuse,
or dependence, non-corrected visual deﬁcits as determined by
the medical records, were excluded from the study. As well, the
attending psychiatrists veriﬁed that the participants were not
under the inﬂuence of any recreational drugs or alcohol prior to
experimentation.
The diagnosis of pScz was made by the attending psychiatrists
and conﬁrmed by ES according to DSM-IV (American
Psychiatric Association [APA], 1994) diagnostic criteria. The
clinical group was recruited from the outpatient clinic for young
adults with psychosis of the Institut Universitaire en Santé
Mentale de Montréal. Their medication had to be stable 2 weeks
prior to data collection.
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The non-clinical group was recruited from the community
via posters, word-of-mouth and from talking to groups of
individuals. Their socio-demographic proﬁle (age, education,
parental education) was comparable to that of the clinical
group and their immediate family history (parents, siblings)
had to be free of schizophrenia and other psychosis related
disorders. They had to be free of Axis I and II comorbidity,
neurological problems, head trauma, alcoholism, substance
abuse, or dependence, non-corrected visual deﬁcits. This
information was obtained during an extensive telephone
interview with the potential candidates.
Measures
Clinical Evaluation (Kay et al., 1987)
The clinical group was evaluated using the Positive and
Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) during a semi-structured
interview. A second psychiatrist independently validated the
ratings on the PANSS. The rated >4 on one or more of the
following characteristic symptoms on the PANSS: grandiose
ideas, delusions, or hallucinations, and persecutory ideation.
Neuropsychological Measures
WAIS-III (Wechsler, 1997)
An abridged French version of the WAIS-III (Pilgrim et al.,
1999) was used to evaluate the intelligence of the participants
in order to control for any potential contribution of this
variable to the ToM measures. An estimate of VIQ was
obtained using the following subtests: Information, Similarities,
Digit Span, and Arithmetic. An estimate of PIQ was obtained
using the following subtests: Picture Completion, Block Design
Substitution.
Theory of mind tasks
Theory of mind was measured using ﬁve diﬀerent tests: reading
the mind in the eyes test (RMET; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001),
Hinting Task (Corcoran et al., 1995; Marjoram et al., 2005),
Strange Stories (Happé et al., 1998), and Faux pas (Stone et al.,
1998) and Conversations and Insinuations (C and I; Ouellet et al.,
2010).
Reading the mind in the eyes test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The
RMET is a ﬁrst order false belief test of recognition of
mental states and emotions (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Craig
et al., 2004). It consists of 36 images of the facial area
around the eyes, each image illustrating a diﬀerent mental
state. The test has been found to distinguish between patients
with schizophrenia and non-clinical participants (Bora et al.,
2008; Kettle et al., 2008). The French version of the multiple
choices was taken from the web site www.autismresearchcenter.
com.
Hinting task (Corcoran et al., 1995; Marjoram et al., 2005). The
Hinting Task is a verbal measure of ﬁrst and second order
false beliefs (Bora et al., 2009a,b). It tests the ability to infer
the real intentions behind indirect messages of the speaker
(Corcoran et al., 1995; Bliksted et al., 2014). There are two
versions of this test, each having 10 stories of social interactions
in which one person sends an indirect message to another. These
two versions were found to distinguish between patients with
schizophrenia (Uhlhaas et al., 2006) with a high level of social
functioning and those with a low level of social functioning (Bora
et al., 2006b), between patients with schizophrenia and paranoid
symptoms and patients with negative symptoms (Bora et al.,
2008). A combined score derived from both versions were used
in this study.
TABLE 1 | Group comparisons between paranoid schizophrenic (pScz) and
non-clinical groups.
pScz Non-clinical
n = 21 n = 29 t(48)
M (SD) M (SD)
Age (yr) 25.71 (4.44) 23.07 (3.2) 2.45∗
Education, subjects (yrs) 10.71 (1.55) 12.03 (1.18) −3.42a∗∗
Education, parents (yrs) 11.94 (2.06) 12.91 (2.45) −1.38ns
FSIQ 99.95 (11.58) 110 (11.04) −3.11b∗∗
VIQ 100.81 (11.84) 109.07 (14.82) −2.47c∗
PIQ 98.24 (12.09) 111.03 (13.83) −3.40∗∗
Age at diagnosis (yrs) 21.57 (2.50)
Chronicity (yrs) 5.67 (5.13)
PANSS positive symptoms (0–49) 21.19 (2.46)
Hallucinations/delusions (0–7) 4 (1.34)
Grandiose ideas (0–7) 2,38 (0,74)
Persecutory ideation (0–7) 3,86 (1,15)
PANSS negative symptoms (0–49) 17,48 (4,72)
PANSS psychopathology (0–112) 39,43 (6,67)
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01.
aGiven positive skewness of age in patients (z = 1.059/0.501) and negative
(z = −1.333/0.434 = −3.07) in controls, the test was confirmed by Mann–Whitney
U = 134.5, p = 0.001.
bFSIQ was positively skewed in controls (z = 1.068/0.434 = 2.46) and acceptably
symmetrical in patients (z = 0.837/0.501 = 1.67). The former is attributed to
sampling bias rather that to scale non-linearity. Group difference is confirmed by
Mann–Whitney U = 153, p = 0.003.
cVerbal IQ is positively skewed in patients (z = 1.085/0.501 = 2.16) and acceptably
symmetrical in controls (z = 0.242/0.434). The group difference is still significant by
Mann–Whitney U = 190, p = 0.024.
TABLE 2 | Group comparison on ToM measures scaled for maximum of








Hinting taska 72.3 (10.8) 92.6 (4.0) 1,48 87.66∗∗ 64.6
C and Ib 52.3 (14.3) 73.8 (10,5) 1,47 38.76∗∗ 45.2
Strange storiesc 64.6 (21.9) 94.6 (8.6) 1,48 44.97∗∗ 48.4
Faux Pasd 67.8 (22.8) 93.2 (10.5) 1,48 48.24∗∗ 50.1
RMET 56.2 (8.0) 60.2 (11.0) 1,48 1.18 2.4
aFSIQ would have been a significant covariate (p = 0.009) but is not included
because homogeneity of slope was subsequently rejected (p = 0.008).
bFSIQ covariable: F(1,47) = 12.04, p = 0.001.
cFSIQ would have been a significant covariate (p = 0.010) but is not included
because homogeneity of slope was subsequently rejected (p = 0.006).
dThe back transformed means are 73.7 and 98.1.
∗∗p < 0.01.
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(n = 29) M (SD)
Df F Covar F Group η2p(%)
Digit SpanQ (DS) [Scaled Score (SS) forward and backward] 9.67 (2.13) 9.00 (2.82) 47 Q9.04 0.83 1.7
DS forward (SS) 6.72 (1.03) 6,24 (1.24) 47 Q5.57 1.92 3.9
DS backward (SS) 4,76 (1,29) 4.76 (1,55) 47 Q7.59 0.00 0.0
Similarities (SS)a 10.88 (2.33) 10.19 (3.61 48 2.72 5.4
Trails B–A (sec)b 41.43 (18.23) 34.07 (18.07) 47 2.18 4.4
Stroop interference (sec)c 50.73 (10.11) 50.86 (11.11) 47 1.45 3.0
Stroop interference (# errors)d 2.10 (3.03) 1.35 (2.37) 47 2.56 5.2
Stroop flexibility (sec) 59.00 (11.32) 59.62 (16.90) 46 E5.75 0.36 0.1
Stroop flexibility (# errors)e 2.07 (2.62) 2.82 (2.63) 46 0,89 0.28
Fluidity (phonological – # words)e 33.70 (11.08) 34.55 (11.02) 47 0.70 0.1
Fluidity (semantic – #words)f 36.02 (9.12) 39.41 (7.80) 45 Q7.70 1.58 3.4
Hayling control condition (sec)g 42.31 (18.73) 38.85 (18.81) 41 0.34 0.8
Hayling inhibition (# errors)h 8.06 (2.39) 4.27 (3.17) 47 29.83∗∗ 38.8
Brixton abani 2.5 (1.86) 1.79 (1.66) 42 1.68 3.8
Tower of London (TOL) (execution time: sec)j 187.95 (79.51) 192.5 (91.53) 45 Q5.84 0.83 1.8
TOL (# errors)k 0.40 (0.75) 0.21 (0.42) 46 n.a.
TOL (planning time: sec)l 18.10 (19.96) 50.89 (32.58) 45.1 n.a. t = 4.31∗∗ d = 1.01
TOL (moves) 38.35 (13.65) 16.68 (11.56) 46 35.26∗∗ 43.4
Zoo map planning time (sec)m 30.05 (44.63) 23.79 (26.90) 46 0.28 0.6
Zoo Map (# errors) 1.05 (0.85) 0.55 (0.63) 46 5.49∗ 10.7
Zoo map (execution time: sec)n 111.74 (62.76) 40.59 (33.15) 45 5.70 14.43∗∗ 24.3
WCST (# categories)o 3.42 (1.54) 4.52 (0.92) 42 8.99∗∗ 17.6
WCST (perseveration errors)p 7.95 (4.60) 4.96 (4.04) 42 7.06∗ 14.4
WCST (non-perseveration errors NP) 6.84 (5.29) 4.90 (3.05) 42 4.63∗ 9.9
QMean adjusted for FSIQ.
EMean adjusted for years of education.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
aFSIQ covariable excluded for lack of homogeneity of regression slopes (p = 0.04).
bOne control missing. Score square root transformed, no constant added, to reduce skewness from 0.941 (z = 2.13) to 0.356 in controls (0.211 to −0.046 in patients).
Back transformed means are 36.35 and 34.00.
cOne patient missing. Because of excess skewness in controls (z = 1.323/0.434 = 3.05), transforming by SQRT(score-35) made the skewness within on standard error
in both groups. Back transformed means are 52.47 and 48.10.
dOne patient missing. Because of excess skewness in controls (z = 1.259/0.434 = 2.90), transforming by SQRT(score) made the skewness within on standard error in
both groups. Back transformed means are 2.48 and 1.27.
eOne patient missing.
fOne subject missing in each group.
gOnly available for 16 patients and 27 controls.
hOne patient excluded as an outlier, being at z = −4.7 from the remaining of that group.
iAvailable for 16 patients and 28 controls. Because of excess skewness in controls (z = 1.406/0.441 = 3.19), transforming by SQRT(score+0.25) made the skewness
within on standard error in each groups. Back transformed means are 2.65 and 1.96.
jAvaiable for 20 patients and 28 controls. This variable is positively skewed in both groups: z = 1.572/0.512 = 3.07 for the patients and z = 2.015/0.441 = 4.57 for
the controls. The minimum observed was 96. The transformation LtolExec = LG10(score-80) brought the skewness index to.222 and −0.249, respectively. Tabled raw
means do not take the FSIQ covariate into account. Back transformed covaried means are 156.38 and 173.33.
kErrors (0, 1, 2) are distributed 15, 2, 3 for the patients and 22, 6, 0 for the controls. With only two different observed values for the controls, no transformation can
change the skewness. Because of this poor distribution, analysis of covariance is not applicable (n.a.). A chi-square test indicates that the two distributions do not differ
significantly: χ2(2) = 5.13, p = .077.
lTabled means are for 20 patients and 28 controls. But 12 of the patients had the minimum observed score of 10. Since the group variances differ, a t-test for unequal
variances is reported. One patient was clearly an outlier for his group, with a score of 97 (quite normal for controls); without this patient, the mean was 13.95 with an
SD of 7.5, which makes the outlier some 11 SD. above the mean of the remaining patients. Without him, group variance differ even more, the group difference gives
t(31.1) = 5.78 and effect size, based on the SD of the controls, is d = 1.13. But with 12 of the remaining 19 patients at the observed minimum, all statistical tests based
on normal distributions are of doubtful validity. In the 28 controls, skewness was good at z = 0.180/0.441.
mZoo test not available for two patients. Planning time skewness is not acceptable in the patients (z = 1.678/0.524 = 3.20, with z = 0.814/0.434 = 1.88 in controls).
There are several scores of 0 (10 of the 19 patients and 11 of the 29 controls). The transformation lzooplan = LG10(score+0.5) brings skewness to 0.229 and −0.283,
respectively. Back transformed means are 4.01 and 5.91.
nSkewness is acceptable in patients (z = 0.118/0.524) but not in controls (z = 1.025/0.434 = 2.36). The observed minimum is 9. The transformation
szooexec = SQRT(score-9) brings skewness to −0.343 and 0.304. Back transformed means are 89.10 and 35.32.
oAvailable for 19 patients and 25 controls. Skewness is negative in both groups and significantly different from zero in controls (z = −0.907/0.524 = −1.73 et
z = −1.292/0.464 = −2.78). Scores vary from 0 to 6. Transforming into swctscat = 2−SQRT(6-score) preserves the original polarity without producing negative
scores and brings skewness to −0.512 and 0.255, respectively. Back transformed means are 3.63 and 4.67.
pSkewness would be acceptable in patients (z = 0.665/0.524 = 1.27) but is not in controls (z = 1.665/0.464 = 3.59). Range is 1 to 17. Transforming into
lwcEP = LG10(score+2) brought skewness to 0.227 and −0.042, respectively. Back transformed means are 7.02 and 4.50.
qSkewness was at z = 2.941/0.524 = 5.61 in patients and at z = 1.8/0.464 = 3.88 in controls. Range was 1 to 26. The transformation lwcstenp = LG10(score−0.8)
brought skewness to 0.540 and −0.396, respectively. Back transformed means are 5.56 and 3.50.
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Strange stories (Happé, 1994; Happé et al., 1998). This test consists
of eight stories requiring an inference concerning the mental state
of a protagonist (Happé et al., 1998) and eight control stories
requiring a physical inference. This test was found to distinguish
between subjects at high risk for schizophrenia and non-clinical
subjects (Chung et al., 2008), as well as between patients with
schizophrenia and non-clinical subjects (Langdon and Ward,
2009, 2010).
Faux Pas (Stone et al., 1998; Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). This
test consists of 10 stories describing the interaction between two
people, one of whom unknowingly makes a comment that is
insulting or hurtful, about the other person. It has been found
to distinguish between schizophrenic patients with and without
a history of violence (Abu-Akel and Abushua’leh, 2004) as well
as between schizophrenic patients with negative symptoms and
non-clinical control participants (Martino et al., 2007).
Conversations and insinuations (C and I; Ouellet et al., 2010). This
test is composed of four self-contained clips of approximately
2 min duration each, taken from popular French TV programs
(see Ouellet et al., 2010 for details). The subject is required to
make inferences in order to understand the social interactions,
indirect messages, faux pas, white lies, and sarcasm used in the
conversation. Each scene is independent of the others and does
not require any further information in order to understand the
content, nor having viewed previous episodes of the program. See
Ouellet et al. (2010) for a more complete description of C and I.
Executive Function Battery
A battery of EF was used to assess speed of processing (Reitan
and Wolfson, 1985), cognitive ﬂexibility (Trails B–A, see Lezak
et al., 2012) and inhibition (Hayling Sentence Completion Test,
Burgess and Shallice, 1997); (Wisconsin Card Sorting Test –
Abridged, Kongs, 2000; D-KEFS Stroop, Delis et al., 2001), verbal
ﬂuency (D-KEFS Letter and Category Fluency. Delis et al., 2001),
Hayling Sentence Completion Test (Burgess and Shallice, 1997),
deductive reasoning (Brixton Spatial Anticipation Task, Burgess
and Shallice, 1997), problem solving (Tower of London, see
Culberston and Zillmer, 2001) and planning (BADS Zoo Map,
Wilson et al., 1996).
Procedure
The entire battery required two sessions of approximately 2 h
each to administer. The sequence of tests was counterbalanced
between subjects. At the end of the testing, each participant
received eight dollars in compensation. Participants in the clinical
group were tested in the hospital whereas those in the non-
clinical group were tested in a university laboratory.
Statistical Analyses
Analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) adjusted for FSIQ and eﬀect
size (η2p) were used to compare the performances between groups
on each ToM test. Student t-tests or analyses of covariance
(ANCOVA) adjusted for IQ and education where appropriate,
were used to compare the performance of the two groups on the
measures derived from the tests of executive functions. Partial
Pearson correlations within groups were used to examine the
shared variance between EF and ToMmeasures, after controlling
for FSIQ if pertinent.
TABLE 5 | Best executive function predictors of performance on ToM tests.
ToM test pScz group rp2 (%) Non-clinical
group
rp2 (%)
Hinting Task Digit span
backward
29.6 TOL time 15.8
Strange Stories TOL errors 39.6 −





C and I Brixton aban. 37.2 Digit Span 24.9
TOL, Tower of London.
TABLE 4 | Correlations within and between pScz and non-clinical groups, between EF and ToM measures, with FSIQ partialled out (a,b) when it
correlated significantly with that particular variable.
Group EF variable ToM variables
Hinting Taska Strange Storiesa Faux Pas C and Iab
PScz Digit Span backwarda 0.543∗ 0.270 0.340 0.364
Stroop flexibility time −0.222 −0.617∗∗ −0.220 −0.546∗
Hayling errors −0.035 −0.239 0.167 −0.519∗
Brixton aban −0.452 −0.086 −0.369 −0.610∗
Tower of London errors −0.010 −0.629∗∗ −0.020 0.327
Zoo map planning time −0.035 0.141 −0.583∗∗ −0.186
Controls Digit Span SS −0.194 −0.096 0.076 0.441∗
Digit Span forward −0.007 −0.115 0.169 0.499∗∗
Similaritiesb 0.033 0.041 0.411∗ 0.230
Trails B–A −0.006 0.001 0.106 0.062
Tower of London exec. time −0.397∗ 0.085 −0.161 −0.199
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
aCorrelated with FSIQ in patients.
bCorrelated with FSIQ in controls.
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RESULTS
Statistical Analyses
All the transformations used are noted in detail in the subtext of
the relevant tables, where appropriate.
Between Group Comparisons of
Socio-demographic Characteristics
Student t-tests revealed signiﬁcant group diﬀerences for age,
education and IQ measures (Table 1).
Comparison between Groups on ToM
Tests
Given the group diﬀerences in background variables that could
inﬂuence the ToM or EF variables, the group diﬀerences on
these variables were tested ﬁrst by including education and FSIQ
as covariables. Only covariables declared signiﬁcant predictors
of the dependent ToM variable at p < 0.05 were kept and the
homogeneity of regression slopes was veriﬁed. If homogeneity
was rejected (i.e., covariable × dependent variable interaction
signiﬁcant at p < 0.05), the covariable was excluded and the
situation ﬂagged in the tabled report. The standard deviations
reported are the original ones, not reduced by the retained
covariables, if any.
Two ToM variables were signiﬁcantly negatively skewed in
controls because of ceiling eﬀects. The skewness index was
at z = −1.486/0.434 = −3.42 for Strange Stories, with 18
of the 29 controls at ceiling. For Faux Pas, skewness was at
z = −2.958/0.434 = −6.82, with 11 at ceiling. For patients,
skewness was, respectively, at z = −0.713/0.501 = −1.42
and z = −0.795/0.501 = −1.59. Without the participants
performing at ceiling, the skewness for Strange Stories reduced
to z = −0.294/0.661, but for Faux Pas it reduced only to
z = −2.438/0.536 = −4.55. The latter value, in association
with the negative skewness in the patients, warranted a
scale transformation for this variable. The transformation
L Faux Pas = 2-LG10(60.3-Faux Pas) brought skewness to
z = 0.151/0.501 for the patients and to z = −0.282/0.434 all 29
controls and z = 0–698/0.536 for the 18 controls not at ceiling.
The transformed version is used in the statistical analyses, and its
group means are reported back transformed in the original scale.
The scores on the ToM tests were scaled for a maximum of
100 to allow for comparisons between tests prior to analyses. The
eﬀect size (rp2) was also calculated in order to identify those tests
that best distinguished between the two groups. Hinting Task
appear to be the most sensitive followed by C and I, Strange
Stores, Faux Pas, and RMET, in that order. Only RMET did not
distinguish between the groups (Table 2) and was not considered
for further analysis.
Group Comparisons of Executive
Measures
Student t-tests or ANCOVA controlling for IQ and education,
were used to compare the performance of the two groups on the
24 measures derived from the eight EF tests. Only the signiﬁcant
results are presented in Table 3.
Performance of the clinical group was impaired compared
with the non-clinical group, on 8 out of 24 measures derived
from the eight EF tests. The eﬀect size was largest for TOL
planning time (tested by t for unequal variances, eﬀect size using
pooled variance d = 1.01 and using control variance d = 1.13)
and TOL number of moves (η2p = 43.4%) followed by Hayling
inhibition errors (η2p = 38.8%) and by Zoo Map execution time
(η2p = 24.3%).
Relation between Performance on EF
and ToM Measures
Correlations between ToM variables and EF variables were
examined with Education and FSIQ as covariables where
appropriate, ﬁrst in patients and then in controls. Transformed
versions were used, when indicated (see Tables 2 and 3). Only
EF variables that have at least one signiﬁcant correlation with a
ToM variable are reported in Table 4.
Table 5 presents the percentage of variance (rp2) of each ToM
measure that is explained by the scores on the respective EF tests.
There is no overlap between the best EF and ToM measures
within groups. The shared variance diﬀers between tests and
groups, ranging from 29.6 to 44.6% in the clinical group and
from 15.8 to 24.9% in the non-clinical group, which leaves 75.1
to 84.2% of the variance unaccounted for.
DISCUSSION
We ﬁrst predicted that some ToM measures would be more
sensitive and better discriminate between the pScz and non-
clinical group and this hypothesis was conﬁrmed. Hinting
Task is the most sensitive [η2p (%) = 64.6] while RMET
does not distinguish between the two groups. Hinting Task
measures indirect speech acts, requiring distinguishing between
explicit, literal, unambiguous content and the intended, implicit,
ambiguous content (Lukas, 2011; Bliksted et al., 2014). It requires
a sharing of information, some knowledge of the conventions of
conversation, the ability to infer the non-literal primary directive
component of speech, i.e., the ability to identify and decode the
attempt by the speaker to get the listener to do something (Searle,
1975; Hagoort and Indefrey, 2014). The complexity of the task
or any of these requirements may explain the sensitivity of this
measure. The other tests, C and I, Strange Stories, and Faux Pas
are progressively less sensitive in distinguishing between the pScz
and non-clinical groups.
In contrast to our prediction but in agreement with Chung
et al. (2008), few of the measures used in the present study
were sensitive to the pathology even after controlling for IQ.
Of the 24 measures derived from the eight EF tests, only eight
are signiﬁcant. The most sensitive of these measures was Tower
of London planning time. The clinical group took less time
to plan their moves and as a consequence made more moves
than the non-clinical group before ﬁnding a solution to the
problem, although they made a comparable number of errors.
However, when they took as much time as the non-clinical
group to plan their moves on another task (Zoo Map) [η2p
(%) = 0.6], it took them signiﬁcantly longer to ﬁnd the solution
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[η2p (%) = 24.3] and they made signiﬁcantly more errors than the
non-clinical group [η2p (%) = 10.7].
Finally, we predicted that correlations between the diﬀerent
EF measures and ToM tests, would diﬀer suﬃciently within and
between groups to support the contention that there is more than
one component to ToM. As predicted each ToM test had its own
best EF correlate. These ﬁndings as well as the diﬀerences between
best EF predictor of ToM in the pScz and non-clinical groups
would tend to support the contention that there is more than one
ToM component.
A secondary goal of the study of ToM in clinical populations
should be to help elucidate the processes involved in the
pathology. To this end, and based on the content of the tests,
we can derive the following composite image. Patients with
paranoid schizophrenia have problems with on-line planning and
anticipation of the consequences of their actions (TOL errors)
and it is harder for them to switch from one mode of responding
to another (Stroop Condition 4 – ﬂexibility time; see also Ibáñez
et al., 2014). They especially take more time to plan when
confronted with a complex task that requires a lot of thought and
planning before initiating any action (Tower of London planning
time). They also are more likely to abandon any eﬀort to deduce
a rule when it changes without notice (Brixton).
At a social cognitive level, they have diﬃculties (1) correctly
interpreting another’s state of mind in order to best be able to
explain what one might consider unusual behavior in the context;
(2) correctly perceiving and interpreting indirect messages;
(3) detecting and understanding an inadvertent, inappropriate
comment and the eﬀect that this comment could provoke. These
diﬃculties overlap well with the list of ToM abilities described by
Lysaker et al. (2008).
If one is inclined to agree that there is more than one
component to ToM then what is needed is a model of these
components rather than a list. Such a model should be based on
the developmental trajectory of the components, the dissociation
of neural pathways, and the link between components at diﬀerent
stages of development (Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan, 2000; e.g.,
are ﬁrst order beliefs a prerequisite to the development of second
order beliefs?). One suchmodel could be as follows: ﬁrst→second
order beliefs ↔(NB – indicating the possibility of an overlap. See
for example Weimer et al., 2012) emotional beliefs, → order
beliefs of intention (see for example Baron-Cohen et al., 1999;
Brüne et al., 2007; Martino et al., 2007; Zalla et al., 2009).
LIMITATIONS
The results of this study provide evidence for a multicomponent
model of ToM and a message to researchers for the need to
identify what these components might be and how they may
be aﬀected in various clinical populations. However, there is
an important need for replication studies given the relatively
small sample and the fact that the results of this study, taken at
face value, could be interpreted as being attributable to chance
(24 comparisons between two groups, eight signiﬁcant results –
Table 3). However, it should be noted that seven of the eight
measures were derived from just three out of the eight tests:
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (3), Zoo Map (2), Tower of London
(2). If the distribution was random one would expect the results
from more EF tests to be signiﬁcant. Also, chance remains a
viable alternative explanation for most of the correlations in
Table 4 (four ToMmeasures, 24 EF measures and two groups: 11
signiﬁcant results, 4 of which were at the 0.01 level). These results
remain to be conﬁrmed by others.
Finally, the diﬀerences between the results on the EF
measures and the correlations between the measures and ToM
measures may be attributable to the limited psychometric
qualities of these tests (see Green et al., 2008) and the
fact that we did not control for anxiety (Lysaker et al.,
2010; Achim et al., 2011, 2013). There is also a lack of
important information concerning the psychometric qualities
of each ToM test (Green et al., 2008) although concomitant
validity in terms of predicting group membership appears
to be acceptable, as does test–retest reliability. Finally, the
number of EF and ToM measures used in this study while
numerous, do not account for all tests and measures used
in this domain. It is quite possible that the inclusion of
other tests would modify the ﬁndings. More participants from
this clinical group need to be tested on this and similar
batteries in order to determine the reliability and validity of the
results and the applicability of the clinical description to the
population.
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